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· · " l't f 1· f suggest two The phrases " sanctity of hfe" versus qua I Y o 1 ' . di· 
polarities in contemp~rary debates ~hi~~ have come-~··_ ·one=~~ 1;ov· 
viduals parents hospital staff, the JUdiciary, the legis lure . ·de 
' ' · . · SUlCI ' 
ernment. These debates range over many Issues . . ab ~ ti ~n, hich 
euthanasia and the desperately difficult and tragic CH'C ISIOOS ~ rns 
sometimes face parents and physicians in the trea~m eni of_ ne~eolast 
suffering from severe disabilities . In this paper I will deal w~th t f who 
question only. I will not directly address the complex questwn ° .. 00. 
. . . . f deCJSI 
should decide but will consider the general cntena 0 1 1·th ' . · · ill dea w 
making. The paper has three sectwns. The fmt sectwn w . JarlY 
. . . · part1cu 
some recent cases which have raised these Issues m a 1 gisla· 
· ·11 t l. e recent e dramatic way. In the second sectwn I WI ou me som .f hoW 
tion on these matters. In the third section_ I will _se~~ to_ clan yroach 
"quality of life " ethics and "life" or "sanctity of hfe ethiCS ~panp ctitY 
. . . f d . · of the ' s such questiOns. I will conclude by de en mg a verswn 
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of life" ethic and showing how that could yield practical conclusions 
in the cases dealt with. · 
There have been many stories of this kind, but two in particular 
have brought these issues into the public arena. The first is that of 
"infant Doe." He was born with Down 's syndrome and an impaired 
esophagus which prevented his being fed. The parents, acting on medi-
cal advice which seems to have been of debatable accuracy, decided to 
deny medical treatment of the impairment with the result t hat he 
could not take food. He was left , unfed and untreated , in a Blooming-
ton, Ind., hospital for eight days until he died of " natural causes" on 
April 16, 1982.1 The case went to the courts. In response to the 
public outcry which this event occasioned, the Reagan administration 
sent, at the President's request , a memorandum from t he Department 
of Health and Human Services warning hosp itals that they would risk 
losing federal funds if they withheld from a handicapped infant nutri-
tional sustenance or medical or surgical treatment required to correct 
a threatening condition, solely because of the handicap. The Adminis-
tration based its position on Section 504 of t he Rehabilitation Act of 
1973, which prohibits any discriminat ion on the basis of handicap. 
Warning notices had to be placed and " hot lines" were established for 
the reporting of suspected cases.2 However, t he regulations were chal-
lenged and a federal court declared them invalid. A final rule was 
eventually adopted including a number of modifications. This rule 
took effect in February, 1984. a 
By this time, however, a second story had started to unfold. Baby 
Jane Doe was born with spina bifida, an open spine condition; hydro-
cephalus, excess fluid on the brain; and microcephaly, an abnormally 
Stnall head.4 The physicians informed her parents that , unless she had 
surgery to correct the spina 'bifida and hydrocephaly, her life expec-
tancy ranged from a few weeks to two years . With surgery, she might 
SUrvi~e 20 years, but would be severely retarded, epileptic, paralyzed, ~dden, and subject to constant urinary tract and bladder infec-
/ons.5 Her parents decided to forego corrective surgery. This, they 
elt? ~ould only prolong a life of suffering. They chose instead to use 
antibiotics to protect against infection of the spinal column. 
th Again the matter was taken to the courts . After a series of hearings, 
e case came to a U.S. Court of Appeals. In February, 1984, the 
court ruled : (1) that Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act does not ~?Ply to treatment decisions involving seriously ill newborns, and (2) 
~n May) that the regulations themselves were " invalid, unlawful and 
\V Ust be ~e~ aside." As a result of this decision the federal government si~prohtbtted from investigating or regulating such t reatment deci-
F' · The burden of settling the controversy passed to Congress. 6 
on .~ally, after more than a year of stormy debate, Congress agreed 
inf Baby Doe:• legislation designed to protect seriously handicapped 
ants from the withholding of life saving treatment. The legislation 
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was signed into law on October 9, 1984. This legislation requ iJ 
state to set up procedures in its child protective services sys 
respond to and, if proper, to intervene legally in cases wr 
withholding of medical treatment is disputed. The procedur< 
provide for consultation and notification to the state child pn 
agency in cases of suspected medical neglect. States which de 
up the required procedures would risk losing agency funds. 
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Child abuse is redefined to include the ~'withholding of rr 
indicated treatment from disabled infants with life-threateni1 
tions." This phrase is defined to mean the "failure to respon 
infant's life-threatening conditions by providing treatment (t< 
appropriate nutrition, hydration and medication) which, in ' 
ing physician's reasonable medical judgment, will be most lik 
effective in ameliorating or correcting all such conditiom 
exceptions are indicated where treatment is not required. 1 
(1) the infant is chronically and irreversibly comatose; (2 ) 
vision of treatment would (i) merely prolong dying, (ii) not 
tive in ameliorating or correcting all of the infant's life-t h 
conditions, or (iii) would be otherwise futile in terms of the ~ 
the infant or ( 3) the provision of treatment would be virtuall 
terms of the survival of the infant, and the treatment itself L 
circumstances would be inhumane. 7 
~se are: 
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What Would Be Implications? 
What would be the implications of this legislation for i fant Doe, 
and Baby Jane Doe? In the case of Infant Doe, the refusa f correc· 
tive surgery would seem to qualify clearly as "withholdi· ~ of med· 
ically indicated treatment from disabled infants with life .. 1reatening 
conditions." Had this law been in existence in 1982 the B<-;omington 
Baby Doe could not have been starved to death bee~ tse it was 
retarded.s The situation of Baby Jane Doe seems, at least ac f irst sight, 
to be somewhat different. Infant Doe was deprived of t reatment 
which would have been given to other "normal" infants w1t.h a similar 
condition, allegedly because he was retarded. Was Baby Jane Doe 
deprived of treatment because she was, or would be, retarded? Or was 
the reason the whole range of disabilities from which she would suffer 
even after treatment to correct the life-threatening conditions? would 
treatment be required for other infants suffering from a similar range 
of disabilities, where the life-threatening conditions could be cor· 
rected, but the other disabilities could not? No doubt there will be 
further discussion aimed at clarifying the precise meaning of the laW-B~t, as I :ead it, it requires that if the life-threatening condition of t~e 
disabled mfant can be corrected or ameliorated it must be treate · 
The exceptions provided for do not seem to appl~ in the case of BabY 
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Jane Doe. She was not, apparently, irreversibly comatose, even if she 
would have been severely retarded. She was not "dying," so that the 
treatment would not merely have prolonged dying. The treatment 
would not have been virtually futile in terms of her survival. There-
fore, it would seem that, in terms of the law, she should have been 
treated. 
The law does not provide the ethical rationale for its provisions and 
probably it should not be expected to do so. However, the ethical 
perspective on these matters is our major interest here. I will therefore 
~ke up that perspective, and in particular explore how " quality of 
life" ethics and "sanctity of life" ethics would seek to resolve the 
dilemmas. 
We can approach the issues on three levels. The first is purely 
descriptive. Thus, we could begin by simply describing the functions 
or capacities by which we identify "human life." These would be, for 
ex~ple, vital and metabolic functioning, sentience, consciousness, 
~es1re, relating to others. On a second level we could make value 
t~dgments about such functions or qualities. These functions or quali-
_Ies are goods or values. On a third level we could make normative 
. ~udgments about how we should respond to persons whose lives 
mclude these functions or qualities. . 
T~e crucial differences between the different ethics appear in the 
~ay 1~ which they make these value judgments and the way in which 
bey Incorporate these value judgments into normative judgments 
~ out_ the right way to respond to or treat persons. 9 For example, a 
1 
qu~hty of life" ethic would make a value judgment such as the fol-
_owmg: a life which has the qualities of ·vital and metabolic function-
~~ plu~ sentience, consciousness, desire and the capacity to relate to 
fo er~, 1s of more value than a life which has only vital and metabolic unctions 10 T h . . t · o w om are such hves of more or less value? Different 
V
yalpes of "quality of life" ethics would reply that what counts is the 
ue of h · fa il sue a l~fe ~o. society, to more particular groups, such as the 7 Y, or _to the IndiVIdual herself or himself who is living that life. 
eth~ movmg to the level of normative judgments "quality of life" "n~~s would t~en form such judgments as: such a' low quality life is 
We worth savmg," or "not meaningful" or "not worth living." Thus are not bl" ' argu 0 1ged to sustain such lives, and, as some would go on to 
char e, t m~y . or even ought to, directly take such lives. That is, the 
reJ·ecatc eristlc feature of a typical " quality of life" ethic is that it 
s the · · 
rejects th prm~lple of the equality of human lives and with that 
. Th e equality of human persons .II 
dent ~~et~e, h~wever, two kinds of " quality of life" judgments evi-
infant Doe _stones I have re~oun~e~ ab?ve. Th~ ~irst take~ this form: 
to meet thels retarded, th~t 1s, h1s hf_e 1~ of_ ~ef1c1ent quaht~ . He fails 
to be value-test which we reqmre md1v1duals to meet 1f they are 
accepted into the community of equal persons. Therefore, we 
August, 1985 261 
" 
are not called on to provide him with the treatment we wou 
"normal," equal persons. This is the clearest expression of a 
treat, solely on the ground of handicap . Such a judgment is n 
a form of discrimination. It violates the principle of equal 
against justice. 12 It may well be that the decision not to t 
Jane Doe was based on a similar argument. But another inte 
is possible and this brings us to another kind of "qualit 
judgment. . 
give to 
fusal to 
nifestly 
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The second type takes the following shape: the kind of 
Baby Jane would live even after the surgery would be d 
certain qualities and would have many negative qualitie 
retardation, epilepsy, paralysis, restriction of movement, col 
or discomfort. Therefore, that kind of life would not be 
value to her. It could, indeed, be considered a harm. 13 Wt. 
to harm other individuals, therefore we ought not sustain I 
life. In this kind of argument there is no direct discriminat 
Baby Jane merely because her life is allegedly of less value 
son to others. It is, of course, possible that this second ki 
ment could be put forward to disguise the "real" reas 1 
treatment which might well be of the first kind . But t h 
ments are genuinely distinct . 
n against 
com pari· 
1. of argu· 
Argument Has Obvious Problem 
for non· 
two argu· 
There is one obvious problem with such an argum 1t. As ~as 
argued in the brief presented by the Spina Bifida Ass< iation m a 
court case which concerned Baby Jane Doe, we cannot kr .w what the 
outcome will actually be after treating such infants. 14 l • fact, m~Y 
such infants have done much better than was expected . 1 This ~e:~ 
the case, we should be extremely cautious in attempt i· .;;; ~uc~ J~ :f 
ments ahead of time. Indeed it could well be argued, th ., t m vle t 
. 1 ld trea the possibility of a reasonably satisfactory outcome, we s 1ou 
all such infants. . d ith 
However, it may well be that tragic outcomes can be pt ed1cte wted 
a high degree of probability. May such arguments as that presen . 
above be used or is the approach inherently defective? Can such ar~ 
ments be faulted as ethical arguments? This question has been mu~r 
debated. In particular, there has been ~onsiderable controver~~no:he 
one particular form of the argument. Th1s has proposed that , w 
1 
ron· 
infant's condition is such that it has no potential for human re ~ 1 ed 
ships or if the potential would be utterly submerged and undeve opt
1
· -1 
' . . . d ·t poten !II in the mere struggle to surv1ve, then that hfe has ach1eve 1 s 
1 
have 
and thus has no further claims on our life-sustaining care. 16 As f the 
already noted this kind of argument does not seem to be 0 JeSS 
' . l' . . d ' 'duals as discriminatory kind wh1ch evaluates some 1vmg m 1v1 
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than others, and so denies fundamental equality. In this account, such 
infants have less or no further claims ori our care because a certain 
kind of living is no longer a good or value for such infants. The issue is 
the good of this individual , not a comparison by which this individual 
is judged less good or valuable than other individuals. The basic prob-
lem seems to be in the way the value judgment is made about that 
kind of living. Thus, a certain level of living is judged to be a good or 
value for this individual only if it can (i.e., has the potential to) 
provide for other "higher goods" such as human relationships. Some 
critics would see here a subtle form of a "consequentialist" ethic. lB I 
would suggest there is another difficulty. The capacity inherent in one 
level of living to make possible "higher" levels of living is one aspect 
of the goodness or value of that level of living. But it is not clear to 
me, that when that capacity is lacking, this limited living ceases to be a 
good altogether for the individual who lives that life. It is still the living 
of a person, and that living person still has claims on our care. A better 
approach would be not to attach degrees of good to the living of that 
person, but to recognize that we have positive duties in response to 
that living person and then to examine the scope and limits of those 
.duties. This view of the matter is characteristic of the typical "sanctity 
of life" ethic and I will now seek to outline the basic form of this 
approach. 
In the Roman Catholic tradition, there are two especially significant 
statements of special relevance to the subject of this paper. The first is 
from Pius XII: 
· · · normally one is held to use only ordinary means - according to circum· 
stances of persons, places times and culture- that is to say , means that do 
not involve any grave burden for oneself or another. A more strict obligation 
Would be too burdensome for most men and would render the attainment 
of the higher, more important good too difficult . Life, health, all temporal 
~ctivities are in fact subordinated to spiritual ends. On the other hand, one 
18 
not forbidden to take more than strictly necessary steps to preserve life 
and health, as long as he does not fail in some more serious duty. 19 
!here are several noteworthy features of this statement. The question 
15 ~hether the means of treatment impose a grave burden on the 
subject or another. The dominant perspective is that of the subject-
rson who bears responsibilities in relation to the spiritual ends of ~rnan living. A requirement to bear what is, for this person, too great 
a Urden in relation to her or his capacities, would place such a weight ~~ herj~~ that it could exceed her/his moral strength, and thus make 
d ~ attammg . of these spiritual ends excessively difficult. Thus, the t; Y to sustam one's life is a positive, but a limited duty. Further, in 
15
1 matter the limits are expressed by saying that one is obliged to use on y " d' Usuan or mary means" to preserve that life. Ordinary means were 
all . Y. understood to be those which held out a prospect of benefit, Pa~Vlat10n or cure, and did not entail an undue burden in terms of In a · 
' nxlety, expense, etc. 
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The second relevant statement is the Declaration on Et hanas~ 
issued by the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the ~aith in 
1980. This document explains the reasons why human life is ~ ~ood to 
be fostered and protected.2° 1) Human life is the basis of a human 
goods, and the necessary source and condition of every huma activity 
and of all society. 2) Human life is sacred, and no one may t ;pose of 
it at will. 3) Believers are in life something greater, namely 1 gift of 
God's love, which they are called upon to preserve and mak fruitful. 
The same document indicates, in a summary way, why the 1king of 
the life of an innocent person is wrong: a) It opposes God love for 
that person; b) It violates a fundamental right; c) It is a re. ction of 
God's sovereignty. 
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The document then deals with the obligation to preserve 
life. It notes that the traditional terms "ordinary" and " < 
ary" may seem today to be less clear. The terms are imJ 
modern medical science has made rapid progress in devel 
treatments. Some, it is noted, prefer to speak of "proport i 
"disproportionate" means. According to the statement, 
judgment can be made in regard to the means by studying: 
of treatment; 2) its degree of complexity and risk; 3) its c 
possibilities of using the means; 5) comparing these with 
which can be expected; 6) taking into account the stat 
person and his or her physical and moral resources. It r 
judged that the treatments impose on the patient strain a 
out of proportion to the benefits to be gained. 
The particular difficulty which arises in our present C( t ext is the 
application of these criteria in the case of an infant. The at ter docu· 
ment calls on us to take into account the "moral resot~ ·es" of the 
person. As Pius XII made clear this factor is crucial to t question, 
since the key question is whether the subject may or nay not be 
diverted from the "spiritual ends" of human moral livJ ,g by a too 
burdensome obligation. In the case of an infant, of coun ', we do not 
have a person capable of moral choice, that is, we do not 1ave a moral 
subject. The infant cannot itself make the kind of balanc ng judgment 
between burden and benefit needed in resolving the question as to 
whether the treatment is, or is not, proportionate to the results to ~ 
expected. Therefore, in some way or other, others mu:-t make tha 
judgment. 
As I have argued earlier, there are some ways of making that judgi 
ment which must be rejected. The discriminatory kind of " qualitY 0,, 
life" judgment is unacceptable. The second kind of " quality of hfe 1 judgment, which seeks to determine whether or not a certain kind~ ' 
life is, or is not, a good for the infant, seems to be less than fu h~ 
satisfactory. There is another way, typically foll owed by those w 
would uphold a "sanctity of life" ethic. a1< 
The starting point of this approach is to recognize that the we 
and defenseless are to be cherished and protected as our neighbors in 
greatest need.21 We have, then, a positive duty to protect that infant 
and that, inescapably, means protecting its life. But, like all positive 
duties, this may be limited. These limits are set by the inherent limita-
tions on the means of treatment available, considered in respect to the 
limitations arising from the disabled condition of the infant. 22 When 
there are insurmountable limits as to what we can do for this patient, 
there are limits to what we ought to do.· Thus, the following criteria 
seem to be acceptable. Treatments, in view of the disproportion 
between the benefits they may confer and the burdens they will 
impose, are themselves "extraordinary," or disproportionate to the 
moral goal of care for the infant when: 
!)treatment may be life-sustaining, but causes further d isabilities 
(for example, some added impairment); 
. 2) treatment may be life-sustaining, but is inseparably associated 
with unduly burdensome conditions (for example, pain or 
risk); 23 or when 
3)treatment is not life-sustaining at all, but only prolongs dying. 
However, there are other factors which must be considered. Some 
. writers who would no doubt wish to uphold a " sanctity of life" r~ther 
than a "quality of life" ethic, point out that "the· obligation to provide 
means necessary to preserve life cannot be reduced to the distinction 
?etween ordinary and extraordinary means. It is determined by the 
m~e~ests of the patient, her/his relationship with the provider and the 
ability of the latter to relie~e the patient's need without serious hard-
ship."24 Furthermore, just as the principle of limitation or positive 
dut~ can be applied to the duty of a person to sustain her /his own life, 
50 It can be applied to the duties of others to sustain the life of 
another. The positive duty to sustain the life of another does not bind 
~all cost, in. the sense of requiring unlimited sacrifice on the part of 
d 
e one seekmg to sustain that life. How then are the limits on this 
uty to be determined? 
Father Ashley's Proposal 
(l)~ther author, ~enedict Ashley, O.P., has proposed the following: 
recei ~the expenditures proportionate to the benefit the patient will 
'"h ve. (2) What would be the '.'reasonable interests" of the patient 
" o wo ld h . , 
reso u ardly Wish her /his family to be unduly burdened, ( 3) The 
singl':ces of the family should be shared by all and not exhausted on a 
Point ~ember.25 The first point is interesting in that it adds a further 
benef~ t reference. to the basic question of the proportion of burden/ 
(the f~ ~ th~ patient .. Now it is asked whether the burden on others 
Point ~f Y) Is proportiOnate to the benefit to the patient. The second 
s I ts from the usual expression "best interests" of the patient, 
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to "reasonable interests," which thus allows the burden the family 
to be taken into account in terms of what the pat i would be 
presumed to wish for that family. The third point invo ' :1 principle 
of fairness, which governs the distribution of resourc .vithin the 
family. Thus, parents would not be unfair in limiting resources 
expended on one member of the family, where such ex ,d iture was 
to the detriment of the others. All of these questio would, no 
doubt, be very difficult to answer in a practical situat ·. But they 
seem reasonable in principle. They indicate, furtherm c that there 
are more questions to be asked than whether the availa t reatment 
can correct or ameliorate the life-threatening condition i e may ask 
about the limits on the duty to care which derive from : 1 t he means ' 
dl·nary" or of treatment (whether they are "ordinary" or "extn t 
"proportionate"); (2) the condition of the patient (wh(' 8r that con· 
dition is irremediable or remediable only to a limited de· e ); (3)the 
resources - physical, psychological, financial - of the rson~ who 
bear responsibility for the patient; (4) the resources of S• : iety, m ~~ 
sense that these are not infinite and hence, must be allo at ed acco 
ing to some principle of distribution. h 
All these factors set limits. But the question still rem.-uns as to t e 
criteria of relevance and relative importance within whJ _;h thes~ fa~· 
tors ought to be assessed. The perspective from which these cntena 
ought be constructed is that of the person-patien· .26 Anoth: 
1 
approach would be exposed ~o th~ danger of imposing t~e exp~ut 
tions and values of others - m th1s case adults - on the mfant. . t 
having proprosed this, we still have to discern how that pa~~:~ 
centered perspective should be interpreted. Should we construe 
1 8 perspective according to an image of the patient-person as m~re Y to 
calculator of maximum benefit to self, or is it more appropnate r 
proceed with an image of that patient-person as a m oral agent~; 
better, as if that patient-person were a moral agent? If we select to 
first option, we would encounter serious difficulties. How are weunt 
know, for example, what calculation of burden/benefit would _co_ted 
for such a patient as a net gain? It may well be that a very luni ed 
form of life would be conceived as a benefit, at least when comP~ an 
with non-existence. On the other hand, if we were to cons~ruc we 
image of this patient-person as an agent capable of moral choices, n-
could construe in some way what such a moral agent would reas001 
ably want. For ex~mple, ~uch a moral agent wo.uld reason a~: s~cb 
want to impose an unposs1ble burden on the family , nor wou tht 
an agent choose to take a course of action which would expo~g, 
agent herself or himself to a condition of life which, after reacd fret' 
stage of development where some degree of consciousn~ss an .ble, 
dom made a striving for moral and spiritual self-realiza~w~ P0~i.Ill~ 
rendered the attaining of the higher spiritual good too difficultbe diS-
larly, such a moral agent would not demand that resources 
266 
tributed in such a way as to favor that agent at the cost of unfair 
deprivation of resources from other moral agents. 
The obvious objection to such a construction is that the infants 
who are being considered here are not moral agents.2 7 That being the 
case, such a construction inevitably involves an imposition of our 
values on those infants. The image of a moral agent which we form is 
inevitably an image of ourselves. It has to be admitted, of course, that 
any such attempt is a construction. Nevertheless, such a procedure 
Would preclude some more objectional moves. Thus, for example, we 
would be prevented from imposing on that patient an arbitrary judg-
~ent that shejhe was not a person like us, or was a person, but of less 
~erent value than us. Similarly, we would be precluded from any 
JUdgment that such a patient has lesser claims to care than we would 
have. Furthermore, we would be precluded from speculations as to 
whether such a patient had less potential than we have, and for that 
reason had lesser claims to care. 
But we could include a consideration of whether a life lived under 
COnditions of severe pain and debility \\{>Uld make the pursuit of 
llloral ends too difficult. Thus, we would have to ask ourselves 
whether treating a life-threatening condition and so prolonging life, 
when we cannot correct or ameliorate a condition which would pro-
duce severe suffering, would place that patient in a position requiring 
llloral effort beyond reasonable limits. If we would not want to be ::ed in such a situation calling for moral heroism, then we ought not 
e another in such a position. 
A Compelling Perspective 
n:uch a perspective compels us to recognize a fundamental equality , 
inao only an equality of life, but an equality of persons. Precisely 
1t' far as we construct the judgments of the patient according to what 
111e value, we recognize that other as an equal. However , a further limit 
. Ust be held clearly in view. There is a difference between construct-~ such a judgment according to the values we hold, and constructing 
n:\ldgJnent on the basis of our situation-dependent expectations. 
it' Us, on the basis of what we have experienced of life and its possibil-0~~ we m~t judge a very restricted form of life to fall far short of 
IUchex~ta.tt?ns. But we are not justified in concluding from this that 
lnd a dintln1shed form of life must be not meaningful for another, 
ex~ not val~ble for another. For an infant who has not had our 
lnd ence of life, a diminished form of life may indeed be valuable, ~~nly mo~e valuable than no life at all. 
degr Y kind of Judgment about the life of another which attributes 
OUr ees of value to that life on the basis of quality criteria drawn from 
expectations of life is inherently defective. Such judgments are an 
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imposition of our presuppositions on another. As such tr 'I fail pre-
cisely because they set aside the equal personhood of tha ther. On 
the other hand, if we recognize the other as an equal pen 1, we may 
reasonably anticipate that, when that other reaches a level f develop-
ment where some, at least minimal, level of freedom and oral striv· 
ing becomes possible, there are levels of suffering which , >Uld make 
that striving too difficult. We are then not engaged in c .::: iding for 
another whether or not herjhis life is more or less valuable. t ather, we 
acknowledge in that other a common humanity with a con• wn call to 
moral fulfillment . At the same time, we recognize com n limita· 
tions, such that where the call to moral fulfillment reache m individ· 
ual in a condition of considerable pain and suffering, the · .!lowingof , 
that call may be simply beyond that individual's moral cap :ity. Thus, 
the question to be asked is this: if we correct this indi ual's life-
threatening condition so that she jhe survives, but cannot .)rrect con· 
ditions which will leave that individual in pain and sufferin , what will 
be the human condition of that person when shejhe reacl ·s the stage 
of free, moral agency? If It can be anticipated with a hig 1 degree of 
probability that the condition will be such as to impo~ ~ a burden 
beyond reasonable bounds of human moral strength, t h 'n we maY 
judge that our obligation to provide care has reached its lin its. . 
In the light of these considerations, we can consider a further linllt 
to be added to those proposed above. Warren T . Reich has proposed 
that a limit to the obligation to treat is set "when excesstvely burden· 
some qualities are perpetuated by life-sustaining treat ment." 29 fie 
explains this in detail as follows : 
As regards those infants who can be expected to experienc e at least a 
minimal self-consciousness and freedom of will and who the refore will be 
striving to achieve moral (or moral-religious) self-realization , th e duty to 
preserve life may be limited by the excessive hardship that w ou ld foresee· 
ably be experienced by the patient if his entire striving to discove r moral 
m ea ning in life were to be totally submerged in or utterly s trai ned by the 
m ere effort to survive and by the suffering that accompanies that effort.29 
This would seem to me to be acceptable with certain provisos, W~~ 
flow from what has been argued above. These would be : (1 ) proVId 
that this is not construed as a judgment by an external ob~erver,_ tb;; 
such a life is less valuable in itself, or to others, or to the mfant , ( f 
provided that the judgment is not interpreted as an assessme~~ 0,, 
relative value based on the presence or absence of certain " qualttle5 
such as " potential" or " capacity for human relationships"; (3} P~ 
vided that the judgment focuses on the equal personhood of the inr . 
and thus construes the significance of the burden precisely_ a~ ren :r 
ing the pursuit of moral (and religious) self-realizat ion too difficult; 
a person considered as sharing our common, lim ited human ~tren ell' 
Reich suggests that this could apply to infants afflicted wtth _rn t]lt 
ingomyelocele.ao Thus, it might well apply to Baby Jane Doe, I{ 
very pessimistic prognosis were correct. But, as I have indicated there 
are ~easons for doubting the reliability of .such prognoses, both in this 
P&rt~cular case and in the generality of such cases. While such doubt 
P€rsists, the presumption should be in favor of treatment. However, it 
Would seem to be possible that there could be other kinds of cases 
wh~e such a pessimistic prognosis could be made by reasonable medi-
cal JUdgment with a high degree of probability. In such a case the 
range of complex ethical questions which have been discussed here 
COuld I T . , furth eg~. I~ately be as~ed . Whi!~ subsequent discussion will no doubt 
er clarify the precise meamng of the new law it must be asked 
wheth tak · · ' er.,. en literally, the requrrements allow sufficient scope for 
such legitimate concerns. 
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. We are so accustomed to thinking of knowledge, and the gathering of 
It, as unqualifiedly good, that even faithful Christians and Jews are prone 
to forget that their scriptures depict the quest _ for knowledge as a 
so~ce of tragic separation from God. For Christians, the human 
cho1ce for the unqualified pursuit of knowledge is what required 
God's repair of creation through the saving power of Christ. 
. The reminder of our tragic relation to the quest to know everything 
HIS graphically portrayed in the second and third chapters of Genesis. ere is the account of the creation of . man and woman and of a 
wonderful garden. Of its lovely fruit they may freely eat, but not of 
~ne tree- the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. To eat of that 
pe eet m~s deat~. But Adam and Eve, beguiled by the charming ser-
n ~ ' did eat of 1t and the results are with us still. Our earthly life is 
.: a perfect paradise without pain and sweat. Above all, they and we 
~ separated from the tree of life and are mortal, not able on our own 
wer to live eternally. 
a gBu~ is knowledge really to be regarded as forbidden fruit? How can 
a good ~u~h as knowledge be so regarded? Is knowledge, often seen as 
lesso;vil~n Itself, ever to be seen as evil in itself, and the desire for it, no 
fru~a~ has prompted me to dare consider any knowledge, that sacred 
What~ scholars' treasured labors, as, in any sense, to be forbidden? 
spendi~ol would ~ttack a growth industry like researc~?.Governme~t 
1940, t~ for m~1~al research alone soared from 18 million dollars m 
three bil/40 milhon. dollars in 1950, and from there to more than 
strong ion dollars m 1979. The lure of forbidden fruit is rather 
less, onast~ven Eden'~ owner and manager soon discovered. N everthe-
e assumptiOn that David really beat Goliath, I will fashion 
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